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RECENT DECISIONS
This section is divided into two parts; notes and abstracts. The abstracts consist merely
of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes
by the absence of discussion.

NOTES ·
FUTURE !NTERESTS-WORTHIER TITLE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REMAINDER TO NEXT OF KIN WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS PERSONALTY-

The trustee bank petitioned for instructions as to the proper disposition of the
remainder of a trust of personal property, the principal of which amounted to
some $29,000 upon the life beneficiary's death in 1942. The donor had provided for a life estate in the income, the principal to go to the settler's statutory
next of kin under the laws of intestacy of the state of Massachusetts in default of
the exercise by the settler of a reserved power of appointment. The court, having
held that a will which Nicolls, the settler, had executed in favor of various friends
of long standing was not an exercise of the power of appointment reserved in the
trust instrument, the legatees then sought to reach the fund by invoking the rule
of "worthier title," whereby, since a remainder in the trust fund had been
created by the trust instrument to the grantor's heirs, and a title by descent is
deemed a better title than one by purchase, the fund would revert to the settlor's
estate and be distributed under his will. The court held that the doctrine of
"w;orthier title," at least as it applied to equitable interests and interests in personalty, was no more than a rule of construction which could be outweighed by a
-showing of a contrary intent. In this case such an· intent was shown. National
Shawmut Bank of Boston v. loy, (Mass. 1944) 53 N. E. (2d) 113.
Under the so-called "worthier title" doctrine, at common law a remainder
to the grantor's heirs created a reversion in the grantor so that, despite the gift
over, the property stayed in the grantor. Applying the theory to the instant case,
the legatees under Nicholls' will. contended that the trust property would revert
to the settler's estate and would then be subject to distribution according to the
terms of his will. Under the singular situation arising in this case, the decision
that the rule did not apply resulted in vesting the trust estate in cousins of the
settler living in England while the legatees under the will, who were apparently
old friends of the testator, had a claim only to the residue of the decedent's
property outside the fund. Except for the trust there remained less than $ l ooo
in Nicholls' estate and this was primarily consumed in the payment of debts.
The doctrine of "worthier title" by descent still survives from the English common law, but in a somewhat modified form.1 Title by descent was considered
worthier and stronger than title by purchase and therefore if a claim on both
grounds could be made by one and the same person he was deemed to take by
descent rather than by devise. The doctrine has now become partially obsolete,
however. The theoretical basis 2 for the rule is not clear and the explanations
generally given are hardly applicable today, but the practical reasons for the rule
1 The rule was abolished in England in I 8 3 3 and heirs may now take as purchasers. 3 and 4 Will. IV, c. 106, § 3.
2 One writer has said, "the law having determined how title shall pass, 'the act of
the grantor or devisor is construed as a vain and fruitless attempt to give that to the
heirs which the law itself vests in them; it is speaking what the law speaks.'" SIMES, Fu- _
TORE INTERESTS, 261 (1936) quoting from I HARGRAVE's LAW TRACTS 571, Counden
v. Clerke, Hob. 29 at 30 (1646).
-
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were numerous at the time of its inception. Creditors of the ancestpr could not
reach the assets in the hands of the heir if he took by purchase, but they could
reach the property if the estate passed by descent. Some of the profitable incidents
of feudal tenure were lost if estates in land passed by devise, for such incidents
attached only to property passing by descent.3 Two different branches of the rule
have been recognized, one in relation to intervivos conveyances and the other as
to wills. 4 The American Law Institute Restatement of Property takes
tion that the rule does not apply at all in the case of wills, pointing out that the
feudal reasons for the rule are non-existent today, and suggesting that it has
lost its significance in modern decedents' estates law. The Restatement does
recognize it, however, as a rule of construction applying to inter vivos transfers of
land and personalty.G The doctrine was at one time regarded as an absolute rule
of policy, but the Massachusetts court, the question appearing before it here in
relation to personal property,6 considers it simply a rule of construction which
l
8
ln 46 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1933), the author discussing rules favoring title by
descent over title by purchase said, "Out of the unwillingness of medieval landlords to
be deprived of valuable feudal rights arose several doctrines of property law favoring
transmittal by descent, which yielded the rights, over passage of title by purchase, which
denied them." See also Edward H. Warren, "A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs,"
22 TEX. L. REv. 22 (1943). In the form of a lecture Professor Warren presents an
interesting exposition of the rule of "worthier title," its ramifications and modifications,
Under the doctrine, he points out, a gift " 'To the heirs of Sarah' is treated as merely
a blundering attempt by an unskillful conveyancer to express the reversion which would
have arisen by opc!ration of law." Warren then asks the question, is this a correct interpretation and answers it in the affirmative. "It is not within the bounds of reason to
suppose that Sarah meant to give John and Mary [her heirs] a rope wherewith to tie her
hands and deprive her of •.. valuable rights." Id at 23. He advocates that the thing
be treated as a rule of construction rather than of property, but he discusses the arguments for an absolute rule. He mentions the historical one given by Coke, "that there
was something in the nature of legal conceptions that prevented a man from giving to his
heirs, on the ground that a man's heirs were part of himself . . . his thoughf was that
a man could no more convey to his heirs than he could convey to himself." Warren
says, "I regard what Coke said as a characteristic product of medieval philosophy, not
untouched by the whimsical and appraise it accordingly." Id. at 25.
4
Since the rule operates as of the time the gift takes effect, it can never apply to a
grantee designated by name in an inter vivas transfer. A deed takes effect when made
(upon delivery) and at that time the grantor's heirs are not ascertainable. In the case
of a will, however, it may be determined at the time the instrument becomes operative
(i. e. the death of the testator) whether the named donee is or is not also the legal heir.
GPROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 3 14, "Conveyance to the Heirs, or Next of Kin, or
the Conveyor."
"(1) When a person makes an otherwise effective inter vivas conveyance of an
interest in land to his heirs, or of an interest in things other than land, to his next of
kin, then, unless a contrary intent is found from additional language or circumstances,
such conveyance to his heirs or next of kin is a nullity in the sense that it designates
neither a conveyee nor the type of interest of a conveyee.
·
"(2) Neither a rule of construction corresponding to that stated in subsection (1),
nor a rule of law analogous thereto, applies to a devise of an interest in land or in personalty."
6
The doctrine of "worthier title" has been applied to personal property as well as
realty. AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 314. "Due to a
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may be rebutted. The New York Court in the leading case of Doctor v.
Hughes 7 regarded the doctrine as a presumption of construction and not as an
absolute rule of law. The court laid down the proposition that the rule was one
of construction only and then proceeded to decide that the presumption in favor
of the existence of a reversion in the grantor was not rebutted in the case before
it. Cardozo said, "No one is heir to the living, and seldom do the living mean
to forgo the power of disposition during life by directio-!1 that upon death there
shall be a transfer to their heirs...." Thus its interpretation of the doctrine to
some extent would appear to be dictum. Nevertheless Cardozo's view of the rule
has been followed in New York and the Massachusetts court in the instant case
has adopted it,8 deciding that as a matter ·of construction the presumption of a
' reversion to the grantor was rebutted. The court reasoned according to the
maxim, "It is a canon of construction that every word and phrase in an instrument is if possible to be given meaning" and declared that "the construction contended for by the legatees would reduce the provision actually made to a useless
declaration of the law." 9 As a positive rule of law the doctrine's only justification today would seem to be in facilitating the alienability of land. If applied as
an absolute rule it may operate to defeat the intent of a grantor to create a real
remainder in his heirs. Thus there is a tendency to minimize the doctrine's
operation and to consider it a rule of construction ·merely, thereby giving effect
to a contrary intent of the testator or grantor if clearly expressed. Indeed in the
Uniform Property Act, promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, both branches ·of the doctrine of "worthier title" are abolished.10
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prevalence in modern time.:5 of a policy to effectuate the intention of the conveyor when
no good reason requires its frustration, the modern authorities have relaxed this rule of
. law ["worthier title"] into a rule of construction. The rule thus diluted has been extended to interests in personalty with a resultant symetry in the law."
7 122 N.-E. 221, 225 N. Y. 305 (1919).
.
8 The court said, "the rule of 'worthier title' as applied to equitable interests and
interests in personalty, at least, is now no- more than a precept of construction which
may be outweighed by indication of a contrary intent" (53 N. E. (2d) 113 at 118),
the presumption being that a gift to the grantor's heirs is i~ effect a reversion in the
grantor.
9 53 N. E. (2d) 113 at 119. In Whittemore v. Equitable Trust, 165 N. E. 454,
250 N. Y. 298 (1929) it was held that a reservation of power of appointment in the
settler indicated an intent to part with control over the property and to rebutt the presumption of a reversion in the granter where the property, in default of appointment,
was to go to his heirs. The court reasoned that if the settlor had merely established a
life estate, remainder to his heirs, it would indicate that he was not thinking particularly about vesting any interest in the heirs. But where he gave the remainder to his
wife and children and then reserved a power to change that remainder by appointment
it indicates a considered and deliberate gift to his heirs.
10 U. L.A. 9, Miscellaneous Acts, §§ 14, 15, p. 616. The Uniform Act, including these provisions has been adopted by the Nebraska legislature, 1941 C. S. §§ 761014, 76-1015.

